Misdemeanor Attorney Colorado Springs

• (1) (a) A person who drives a motor vehicle or vehicle under the influence of alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, commits driving under the influence. Driving under the influence is a misdemeanor, but it is a class 4 felony if the violation occurred after three or more prior convictions, arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI; vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106 (1)(b), C.R.S.; vehicular assault, as described in section 18-3-205 (1)(b), C.R.S.; or any combination thereof.
• (b)  A person who drives a motor vehicle or vehicle while impaired by alcohol or by one or more drugs, or by a combination of alcohol and one or more drugs, commits driving while ability impaired. Driving while ability impaired is a misdemeanor, but it is a class 4 felony if the violation occurred after three or more prior convictions, arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI; vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106 (1)(b), C.R.S.; vehicular assault, as described in section 18-3-205 (1)(b), C.R.S.; or any combination thereof.
• (c)  Repealed.
• (d)  As used in this section, one or more drugs means any drug, as defined in section 27-80-203 (13), C.R.S., any controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S., and any inhaled glue, aerosol, or other toxic vapor or vapors, as defined in section 18-18-412, C.R.S.
• (e)  The fact that any person charged with a violation of this subsection (1) is or has been entitled to use one or more drugs under the laws of this state, including, but not limited to, the medical use of marijuana pursuant to section 18-18-406.3, C.R.S., shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this subsection (1).
• (f)  “Driving under the influence” means driving a motor vehicle or vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of alcohol and one or more drugs, that affects the person to a degree that the person is substantially incapable, either mentally or physically, or both mentally and physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe operation of a vehicle.
• (g)  “Driving while ability impaired” means driving a motor vehicle or vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, that affects the person to the slightest degree so that the person is less able than the person ordinarily would have been, either mentally or physically, or both mentally and physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe operation of a vehicle.
• (h)  Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging the offense of DUI, it shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as “drove a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both”.
• (i)  Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging the offense of DWAI, it shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as “drove a vehicle while impaired by alcohol or drugs or both”.
• (j)  For the purposes of this section, a person is deemed to have a prior conviction for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI; vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106 (1)(b), C.R.S.; or vehicular assault, as described in section 18-3-205 (1)(b), C.R.S., if the person has been convicted under the laws of this state or under the laws of any other state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of an act that, if committed within this state, would constitute any of these offenses. The prosecution shall set forth such prior convictions in the indictment or information.
• (k)  Repealed.
• (2) (a) A person who drives a motor vehicle or vehicle when the person’s BAC is 0.08 or more at the time of driving or within two hours after driving commits DUI per se. During a trial, if the state’s evidence raises the issue, or if a defendant presents some credible evidence, that the defendant consumed alcohol between the time that the defendant stopped driving and the time that testing occurred, such issue shall be an affirmative defense, and the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the minimum 0.08 blood or breath alcohol content required in this paragraph (a) was reached as a result of alcohol consumed by the defendant before the defendant stopped driving. DUI per se is a misdemeanor, but it is a class 4 felony if the violation occurred after three or more prior convictions, arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI; vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106 (1)(b), C.R.S.; vehicular assault, as described in section 18-3-205 (1)(b), C.R.S.; or any combination thereof.
• (a.5) Repealed.
• (b)  In any prosecution for the offense of DUI per se, the defendant shall be entitled to offer direct and circumstantial evidence to show that there is a disparity between what any tests show and other facts so that the trier of fact could infer that the tests were in some way defective or inaccurate. Such evidence may include testimony of nonexpert witnesses relating to the absence of any or all of the common symptoms or signs of intoxication for the purpose of impeachment of the accuracy of the analysis of the person’s blood or breath.
• (c)  Pursuant to section 16-2-106, C.R.S., in charging the offense of DUI per se, it shall be sufficient to describe the offense charged as “drove a vehicle with excessive alcohol content”.
• (d)
• (I)  It is a class A traffic infraction for any person under twenty-one years of age to drive a motor vehicle or vehicle when the person’s BAC, as shown by analysis of the person’s breath, is at least 0.02 but not more than 0.05 at the time of driving or within two hours after driving. The court, upon sentencing a defendant pursuant to this subparagraph (I), may order, in addition to any penalty imposed under a class A traffic infraction, that the defendant perform up to twenty-four hours of useful public service, subject to the conditions and restrictions of section 18-1.3-507, C.R.S., and may further order that the defendant submit to and complete an alcohol evaluation or assessment, an alcohol education program, or an alcohol treatment program at such defendant’s own expense.
• (II)  A second or subsequent violation of this paragraph (d) is a class 2 traffic misdemeanor.
• (3)  The offenses described in subsections (1) and (2) of this section are strict liability offenses.
• (4)  No court shall accept a plea of guilty to a non-alcohol-related or non-drug-related traffic offense or guilty to the offense of UDD from a person charged with DUI or DUI per se; except that the court may accept a plea of guilty to a non-alcohol-related or non-drug-related traffic offense or to UDD upon a good faith representation by the prosecuting attorney that the attorney could not establish a prima facie case if the defendant were brought to trial on the original alcohol-related or drug-related offense.
• (5)  Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-408, C.R.S., during a trial of any person accused of both DUI and DUI per se, the court shall not require the prosecution to elect between the two violations. The court or a jury may consider and convict the person of either DUI or DWAI, or DUI per se, or both DUI and DUI per se, or both DWAI and DUI per se. If the person is convicted of more than one violation, the sentences imposed shall run concurrently.
• (6) (a) In any prosecution for DUI or DWAI, the defendant’s BAC or drug content at the time of the commission of the alleged offense or within a reasonable time thereafter gives rise to the following presumptions or inferences:
• (I)  If at such time the defendant’s BAC was 0.05 or less, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol and that the defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle or vehicle was not impaired by the consumption of alcohol.
• (II)  If at such time the defendant’s BAC was in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.08, such fact gives rise to the permissible inference that the defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle or vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol, and such fact may also be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether or not the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
• (III)  If at such time the defendant’s BAC was 0.08 or more, such fact gives rise to the permissible inference that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
• (IV)  If at such time the driver’s blood contained five nanograms or more of delta 9-tetrahydrocannabinol per milliliter in whole blood, as shown by analysis of the defendant’s blood, such fact gives rise to a permissible inference that the defendant was under the influence of one or more drugs.
• (b)  The limitations of this subsection (6) shall not be construed as limiting the introduction, reception, or consideration of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or whether or not the defendant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle or vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol.
• (c)
• (I)  In all actions, suits, and judicial proceedings in any court of this state concerning alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offenses, the court shall take judicial notice of methods of testing a person’s alcohol or drug level and of the design and operation of devices, as certified by the department of public health and environment, for testing a person’s blood, breath, saliva, or urine to determine such person’s alcohol or drug level. The department of public health and environment may, by rule, determine that, because of the reliability of the results from certain devices, the collection or preservation of a second sample of a person’s blood, saliva, or urine or the collection and preservation of a delayed breath alcohol specimen is not required.
• (II)  Nothing in this paragraph (c) prevents the necessity of establishing during a trial that the testing devices used were working properly and were properly operated. Nothing in this paragraph (c) precludes a defendant from offering evidence concerning the accuracy of testing devices.
• (III)  The database compiled by the department of public health and environment containing personal identifying information relating to the results of tests of persons’ breath alcohol content, and all personal identifying information thereof, are not public information. The department of public health and environment shall disclose such information only to:
• (A)  The individual who is the subject of the test, or to his or her legal representative;
• (B)  A named interested party in a civil or criminal action in which the test results are directly related, or to his or her legal representative;
• (C)  Any prosecuting attorney, law enforcement officer, state agency, or state and local public official legally authorized to utilize such information to carry out his or her duties; or
• (D)  Any party who obtains an order in a pending civil or criminal case if the court finds the party has shown good cause to have the information. In determining whether there is good cause, the court shall consider whether the materials sought exist; whether the materials sought are evidentiary and relevant; whether the materials are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of the proceeding by the exercise of due diligence; whether the party cannot properly prepare for the proceeding without such production and inspection in advance of the proceeding, and the failure to obtain such inspection may tend to unreasonably delay the proceeding; and whether the request for the information is made in good faith and is not for the purposes of general discovery.
• (IV)  The department of public health and environment may release nonpersonal identifying information from the database in accordance with sections 24-72-101 to 24-72-402, C.R.S.
• (d)  If a person refuses to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any test or tests as provided in section 42-4-1301.1 and such person subsequently stands trial for DUI or DWAI, the refusal to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any test or tests shall be admissible into evidence at the trial, and a person may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination with regard to admission of refusal to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of, any test or tests.
• (e) Involuntary blood test – admissibility.  Evidence acquired through an involuntary blood test pursuant to section 42-4-1301.1 (3) shall be admissible in any prosecution for DUI, DUI per se, DWAI, or UDD, and in any prosecution for criminally negligent homicide pursuant to section 18-3-105, C.R.S., vehicular homicide pursuant to section 18-3-106 (1)(b), C.R.S., assault in the third degree pursuant to section 18-3-204, C.R.S., or vehicular assault pursuant to section 18-3-205 (1)(b), C.R.S.
• (f) Chemical test – admissibility.  Strict compliance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the department of public health and environment shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results at trial unless the court finds that the extent of noncompliance with a board of health rule has so impaired the validity and reliability of the testing method and the test results as to render the evidence inadmissible. In all other circumstances, failure to strictly comply with such rules and regulations shall only be considered in the weight to be given to the test results and not to the admissibility of such test results.
• (g)  It shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results at trial that the prosecution present testimony concerning the composition of any kit used to obtain blood, urine, saliva, or breath specimens. A sufficient evidentiary foundation concerning the compliance of such kits with the rules and regulations of the department of public health and environment shall be established by the introduction of a copy of the manufacturer’s or supplier’s certificate of compliance with such rules and regulations if such certificate specifies the contents, sterility, chemical makeup, and amounts of chemicals contained in such kit.
• (h)  In any trial for a violation of this section, the testimony of a law enforcement officer that he or she witnessed the taking of a blood specimen by a person who the law enforcement officer reasonably believed was authorized to withdraw blood specimens shall be sufficient evidence that such person was so authorized, and testimony from the person who obtained the blood specimens concerning such person’s authorization to obtain blood specimens shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results concerning the blood specimens obtained.
• (i)
• (I)  Following the lawful contact with a person who has been driving a motor vehicle or vehicle and when a law enforcement officer reasonably suspects that a person was driving a motor vehicle or vehicle while under the influence of or while impaired by alcohol, the law enforcement officer may conduct a preliminary screening test using a device approved by the executive director of the department of public health and environment after first advising the driver that the driver may either refuse or agree to provide a sample of the driver’s breath for such preliminary test; except that, if the driver is under twenty-one years of age, the law enforcement officer may, after providing such advisement to the person, conduct such preliminary screening test if the officer reasonably suspects that the person has consumed any alcohol.
• (II)  The results of this preliminary screening test may be used by a law enforcement officer in determining whether probable cause exists to believe such person was driving a motor vehicle or vehicle in violation of this section and whether to administer a test pursuant to section 42-4-1301.1 (2).
• (III)  Neither the results of such preliminary screening test nor the fact that the person refused such test shall be used in any court action except in a hearing outside of the presence of a jury, when such hearing is held to determine if a law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that the driver committed a violation of this section. The results of such preliminary screening test shall be made available to the driver or the driver’s attorney on request.
• (j)  In any trial for a violation of this section, if, at the time of the alleged offense, the person possessed a valid medical marijuana registry identification card, as defined in section 25-1.5-106 (2)(e), C.R.S., issued to himself or herself, the prosecution shall not use such fact as part of the prosecution’s case in chief.
• (k)  In any traffic stop, the driver’s possession of a valid medical marijuana registry identification card, as defined in section 25-1.5-106 (2)(e), C.R.S., issued to himself or herself shall not, in the absence of other contributing factors, constitute probable cause for a peace officer to require the driver to submit to an analysis of his or her blood.
• (7)  Repealed.
• (8)  A second or subsequent violation of this section committed by a person under eighteen years of age may be filed in juvenile court.
• Driving with excessive alcoholic content (DUI per se)
• Driving while ability impaired (DWAI)
• Excess BAC CDL
• Refusing to take a DUI chemical test
• Underage drinking and driving (UDD)
• DUI charges

• (1)  A person commits the crime of violation of a protection order if, after the person has been personally served with a protection order that identifies the person as a restrained person or otherwise has acquired from the court or law enforcement personnel actual knowledge of the contents of a protection order that identifies the person as a restrained person, the person:
• (a)  Contacts, harasses, injures, intimidates, molests, threatens, or touches the protected person or protected property, including an animal, identified in the protection order or enters or remains on premises or comes within a specified distance of the protected person, protected property, including an animal, or premises or violates any other provision of the protection order to protect the protected person from imminent danger to life or health, and such conduct is prohibited by the protection order;
• (b)  Except as permitted pursuant to section 18-13-126 (1)(b), hires, employs, or otherwise contracts with another person to locate or assist in the location of the protected person; or
• (c)  Violates a civil protection order issued pursuant to section 13-14-105.5, C.R.S., or pursuant to section 18-1-1001 (9) by:
• (I)  Possessing or attempting to purchase or receive a firearm or ammunition while the protection order is in effect; or
• (II)  Failing to timely file a receipt or written statement with the court as described in section 13-14-105.5 (9), C.R.S., or in section 18-1-1001 (9)(i) or 18-6-801 (8)(i).
• (1.5) As used in this section:
• (a)  “Protected person” means the person or persons identified in the protection order as the person or persons for whose benefit the protection order was issued.
• (a.5)  (I) “Protection order” means any order that prohibits the restrained person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, or touching any protected person or protected animal, or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or protected animal or premises or any other provision to protect the protected person or protected animal from imminent danger to life or health, that is issued by a court of this state or a municipal court, and that is issued pursuant to:
• (A)  Article 14 of title 13, C.R.S., section 18-1-1001, section 19-2-707, C.R.S., section 19-4-111, C.R.S., or rule 365 of the Colorado rules of county court civil procedure;
• (B)  Sections 14-4-101 to 14-4-105, C.R.S., section 14-10-107, C.R.S., section 14-10-108, C.R.S., or section 19-3-316, C.R.S., as those sections existed prior to July 1, 2004;
• (C)  An order issued as part of the proceedings concerning a criminal municipal ordinance violation; or
• (D)  Any other order of a court that prohibits a person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, or touching any person, or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or premises.
• (II)  For purposes of this section only, “protection order” includes any order that amends, modifies, supplements, or supersedes the initial protection order. “Protection order” also includes any restraining order entered prior to July 1, 2003, and any foreign protection order as defined in section 13-14-110, C.R.S.
• (b)  “Registry” means the computerized information system created in section 18-6-803.7 or the national crime information center created pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 534.
• (c)  “Restrained person” means the person identified in the order as the person prohibited from doing the specified act or acts.
• (d) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 1003, § 6, effective July 1, 2003.)
• (2)  (a) Violation of a protection order is a class 2 misdemeanor; except that, if the restrained person has previously been convicted of violating this section or a former version of this section or an analogous municipal ordinance, or if the protection order is issued pursuant to section 18-1-1001, the violation is a class 1 misdemeanor.
• (a.5) A second or subsequent violation of a protection order is an extraordinary risk crime that is subject to the modified sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-501 (3).
• (b) (Deleted by amendment, L. 95, p. 567, 3, effective July 1, 1995.)
• (c)  Nothing in this section shall preclude the ability of a municipality to enact concurrent ordinances. Any sentence imposed for a violation of this section shall run consecutively and not concurrently with any sentence imposed for any crime which gave rise to the issuing of the protection order.
• (3) (a) Whenever a protection order is issued, the protected person shall be provided with a copy of such order. A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a protection order.
• (b)  A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace officer has information amounting to probable cause that:
• (I)  The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a protection order; and
• (II)  The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of the protection order or the restrained person has received actual notice of the existence and substance of such order.
• (c)  In making the probable cause determination described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), a peace officer shall assume that the information received from the registry is accurate. A peace officer shall enforce a valid protection order whether or not there is a record of the protection order in the registry.
• (d)  The arrest and detention of a restrained person is governed by applicable constitutional and applicable state rules of criminal procedure. The arrested person shall be removed from the scene of the arrest and shall be taken to the peace officer’s station for booking, whereupon the arrested person may be held or released in accordance with the adopted bonding schedules for the jurisdiction in which the arrest is made, or the arrested person may be taken to the jail in the county where the protection order was issued. The law enforcement agency or any other locally designated agency shall make all reasonable efforts to contact the protected party upon the arrest of the restrained person. The prosecuting attorney shall present any available arrest affidavits and the criminal history of the restrained person to the court at the time of the first appearance of the restrained person before the court.
• (e)  The arresting agency arresting the restrained person shall forward to the issuing court a copy of such agency’s report, a list of witnesses to the violation, and, if applicable, a list of any charges filed or requested against the restrained person. The agency shall give a copy of the agency’s report, witness list, and charging list to the protected party. The agency shall delete the address and telephone number of a witness from the list sent to the court upon request of such witness, and such address and telephone number shall not thereafter be made available to any person, except law enforcement officials and the prosecuting agency, without order of the court.
• (4)  If a restrained person is on bond in connection with a violation or attempted violation of a protection order in this or any other state and is subsequently arrested for violating or attempting to violate a protection order, the arresting agency shall notify the prosecuting attorney who shall file a motion with the court which issued the prior bond for the revocation of the bond and for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the restrained person if such court is satisfied that probable cause exists to believe that a violation of the protection order issued by the court has occurred.
• (5)  A peace officer arresting a person for violating a protection order or otherwise enforcing a protection order shall not be held criminally or civilly liable for such arrest or enforcement unless the peace officer acts in bad faith and with malice or does not act in compliance with rules adopted by the Colorado supreme court.
• (6) (a) A peace officer is authorized to use every reasonable means to protect the alleged victim or the alleged victim’s children to prevent further violence. Such peace officer may transport, or obtain transportation for, the alleged victim to shelter. Upon the request of the protected person, the peace officer may also transport the minor child of the protected person, who is not an emancipated minor, to the same shelter if such shelter is willing to accept the child, whether or not there is a custody order or an order allocating parental responsibilities with respect to such child or an order for the care and control of the child and whether or not the other parent objects. A peace officer who transports a minor child over the objection of the other parent shall not be held liable for any damages that may result from interference with the custody, parental responsibilities, care, and control of or access to a minor child in complying with this subsection (6).
• (b)  For purposes of this subsection (6), “shelter” means a battered women’s shelter, a friend’s or family member’s home, or such other safe haven as may be designated by the protected person and which is within a reasonable distance from the location at which the peace officer found the victim.
• (7)  The protection order shall contain in capital letters and bold print a notice informing the protected person that such protected person may either initiate contempt proceedings against the restrained person if the order is issued in a civil action or request the prosecuting attorney to initiate contempt proceedings if the order is issued in a criminal action.
• (8)  A protection order issued in the state of Colorado shall contain a statement that:
• (a)  The order or injunction shall be accorded full faith and credit and be enforced in every civil or criminal court of the United States, another state, an Indian tribe, or a United States territory pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 2265;
• (b)  The issuing court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter; and
• (c)  The defendant was given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
• (9)  A criminal action charged pursuant to this section may be tried either in the county where the offense is committed or in the county in which the court that issued the protection order is located, if such court is within this state.

A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if:

• (a) The person knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person or with criminal negligence the person causes bodily injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon; or
• (b) The person, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm another person whom the actor knows or reasonably should know to be a peace officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, or an emergency medical service provider, causes the other person to come into contact with blood, seminal fluid, urine, feces, saliva, mucus, vomit, or toxic, caustic, or hazardous material by any means, including throwing, tossing, or expelling the fluid or material.

• (1)  Any actor who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact commits unlawful sexual contact if:
• (a)  The actor knows that the victim does not consent; or
• (b)  The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim’s conduct; or
• (c)  The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows that the victim is physically helpless and the victim has not consented; or
• (d)  The actor has substantially impaired the victim’s power to appraise or control the victim’s conduct by employing, without the victim’s consent, any drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose of causing submission; or
• (e)  Repealed.
• (f)  The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and uses this position of authority, unless incident to a lawful search, to coerce the victim to submit; or
• (g)  The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices.
• (1.5)  Any person who knowingly, with or without sexual contact, induces or coerces a child by any of the means set forth in section 18-3-402 to expose intimate parts or to engage in any sexual contact, intrusion, or penetration with another person, for the purpose of the actor’s own sexual gratification, commits unlawful sexual contact. For the purposes of this subsection (1.5), the term “child” means any person under the age of eighteen years.
• (1.7) Repealed.
• (2) (a) Unlawful sexual contact is a class 1 misdemeanor and is an extraordinary risk crime that is subject to the modified sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-501 (3).
• (b)  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), unlawful sexual contact is a class 4 felony if the actor compels the victim to submit by use of such force, intimidation, or threat as specified in section 18-3-402 (4)(a), (4)(b), or (4)(c) or if the actor engages in the conduct described in paragraph (g) of subsection (1) of this section or subsection (1.5) of this section.
• (3)  If a defendant is convicted of the class 4 felony of unlawful sexual contact pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-406; except that this subsection (3) shall not apply if the actor engages in the conduct described in paragraph (g) of subsection (1) of this section.
• (4)  A person who is convicted on or after July 1, 2013, of unlawful sexual contact under this section, upon conviction, shall be advised by the court that the person has no right:
• (a)  To notification of the termination of parental rights and no standing to object to the termination of parental rights for a child conceived as a result of the commission of that offense;
• (b)  To allocation of parental responsibilities, including parenting time and decision-making responsibilities for a child conceived as a result of the commission of that offense;
• (c)  Of inheritance from a child conceived as a result of the commission of that offense; and
• (d)  To notification of or the right to object to the adoption of a child conceived as a result of the commission of that offense.

• Any operator of a motor vehicle who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has violated a state law or municipal ordinance, who has received a visual or audible signal such as a red light or a siren from a police officer driving a marked vehicle showing the same to be an official police, sheriff, or Colorado state patrol car directing the operator to bring the operator’s vehicle to a stop, and who willfully increases his or her speed or extinguishes his or her lights in an attempt to elude such police officer, or willfully attempts in any other manner to elude the police officer, or does elude such police officer commits a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense.

• A person who recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person commits reckless endangerment, which is a class 3 misdemeanor.

• (1) A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she:
• (a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical contact;  or
  •  (b) In a public place directs obscene language or makes an obscene gesture to or at another person;  or
• (c) Follows a person in or about a public place;  or
• (d) Repealed
• (e) Directly or indirectly initiates communication with a person or directs language toward another person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telephone network, data network, text message, instant message, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium in a manner intended to harass or threaten bodily injury or property damage, or makes any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal by telephone, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium that is obscene;  or
• (f) Makes a telephone call or causes a telephone to ring repeatedly, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate conversation;  or
• (g) Makes repeated communications at inconvenient hours that invade the privacy of another and interfere in the use and enjoyment of another’s home or private residence or other private property;  or
• (h) Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to, another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response.
• (1.5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “obscene” means a patently offensive description of ultimate sexual acts or solicitation to commit ultimate sexual acts, whether or not said ultimate sexual acts are normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, anilingus, or excretory functions.
• (2) Harassment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is a class 3 misdemeanor;  except that harassment is a class 1 misdemeanor if the offender commits harassment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person’s actual or perceived race;  color;  religion;  ancestry;  national origin;  physical or mental disability, as defined in section 18-9-121(5)(a);  or sexual orientation, as defined in section 18-9-121(5)(b)
• (3) Any act prohibited by paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section may be deemed to have occurred or to have been committed at the place at which the telephone call, electronic mail, or other electronic communication was either made or received.

• Except as provided in sections 18-4-506.3 and 18-4-506.5, a person commits the crime of second degree criminal tampering if he tampers with property of another with intent to cause injury, inconvenience, or annoyance to that person or to another or if he knowingly makes an unauthorized connection with property of a utility. Second degree criminal tampering is a class 2 misdemeanor.

• (1)  (a) In addition to any sentence that is imposed upon a person for violation of any criminal law under this title, any person who is convicted of any crime, the underlying factual basis of which has been found by the court on the record to include an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), or any crime against property, whether or not such crime is a felony, when such crime is used as a method of coercion, control, punishment, intimidation, or revenge directed against a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship shall be ordered to complete a treatment program and a treatment evaluation that conform with the standards adopted by the domestic violence offender management board as required by section 16-11.8-103 (4), C.R.S. If an intake evaluation conducted by an approved treatment program provider discloses that sentencing to a treatment program would be inappropriate, the person shall be referred back to the court for alternative disposition.
• (b)  The court may order a treatment evaluation to be conducted prior to sentencing if a treatment evaluation would assist the court in determining an appropriate sentence. The person ordered to undergo such evaluation shall be required to pay the cost of the treatment evaluation. If such treatment evaluation recommends treatment, and if the court so finds, the person shall be ordered to complete a treatment program that conforms with the standards adopted by the domestic violence offender management board as required by section 16-11.8-103 (4), C.R.S.
• (c)  Nothing in this subsection (1) shall preclude the court from ordering domestic violence treatment in any appropriate case.
• (2)  Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to persons sentenced to the department of corrections.
• (3)  A person charged with the commission of a crime, the underlying factual basis of which includes an act of domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), shall not be entitled to plead guilty or plead nolo contendere to an offense which does not include the domestic violence designation required in section 16-21-103, C.R.S., unless the prosecuting attorney makes a good faith representation on the record that such attorney would not be able to establish a prima facie case that the person and the alleged victim were currently or formerly involved in an intimate relationship if the defendant were brought to trial on the original domestic violence offense and upon such a finding by the court. The prosecuting attorney’s record and the court’s findings shall specify the relationship in the alleged domestic violence case which the prosecuting attorney is not able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and the reasons therefor. No court shall accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an offense which does not include the domestic violence designation required in section 16-21-103, C.R.S., when the facts of the case indicate that the underlying factual basis includes an act of domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1) unless there is a good faith representation by the prosecuting attorney that he or she would be unable to establish a prima facie case if the defendant were brought to trial on the original offense.
• (4)  No person accused or convicted of a crime, the underlying factual basis of which has been found by the court on the record to include an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), shall be eligible for home detention in the home of the victim pursuant to section 18-1.3-105 or 18-1.3-106. Nothing in this subsection (4) is intended to prohibit a court from ordering a deferred sentence for a person accused or convicted of a crime, the underlying factual basis of which has been found by the court on the record to include an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1).
• (5)  Before granting probation, the court shall consider the safety of the victim and the victim’s children if probation is granted.
• (6)  Nothing in this section shall preclude the ability of a municipality to enact concurrent ordinances.
• (7)  (a) Any misdemeanor offense that includes an act of domestic violence is a class 5 felony if the defendant at the time of sentencing has been previously convicted of three or more prior offenses that included an act of domestic violence and that were separately brought and tried and arising out of separate criminal episodes.
• (b)  The prior convictions must be set forth in apt words in the indictment or information. For the purposes of this section, “conviction” includes any federal, state, or municipal conviction for a felony, misdemeanor, or municipal ordinance violation.
• (c)  Trials in cases alleging that the defendant is an habitual domestic violence offender pursuant to this subsection (7) must be conducted in accordance with the rules of criminal procedure for felonies. The trier of fact shall determine whether an offense charged includes an act of domestic violence.
• (d)  Following a conviction for an offense which underlying factual basis includes an act of domestic violence:
• (I)  If any prior conviction included a determination by a jury or was admitted by the defendant that the offense included an act of domestic violence, the court shall proceed to sentencing without further findings as to that prior conviction by the jury or by the court, if no jury trial is had;
• (II)  For any prior conviction in which the factual basis was found by the court to include an act of domestic violence, but did not include a finding of domestic violence by a jury or that was not admitted by the defendant, the trial court shall proceed to a sentencing stage of the proceedings. The prosecution shall present evidence to the trier of fact that the prior conviction included an act of domestic violence. The prosecution has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• (III)  At the sentencing stage, the following applies:
• (A)  A finding of domestic violence made by a court at the time of the prior conviction constitutes prima facie evidence that the crime involved domestic violence;
• (B)  Evidence of the prior conviction is admissible through the use of certified documents under seal, or the court may take judicial notice of a prior conviction;
• (C)  Evidence admitted in the guilt stage of the trial, including testimony of the defendant and other acts admitted pursuant to section 18-6-801.5, may be considered by the finder of fact.
• (8)  (a) In addition to any sentence that is imposed upon a defendant for violation of any criminal law under this title, if a defendant is convicted of any crime, the underlying factual basis of which is found by the court on the record to be a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in 18 U.S.C. sec. 921 (a)(33), or that is punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and includes an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), the court:
• (I)  Shall order the defendant to:
• (A)  Refrain from possessing or purchasing any firearm or ammunition for the duration of the order; and
• (B)  Relinquish any firearm or ammunition in the defendant’s immediate possession or control or subject to the defendant’s immediate possession or control; and
• (II)  May require that before the defendant is released from custody on bond, the defendant shall relinquish, for the duration of the order, any firearm or ammunition in the defendant’s immediate possession or control or subject to the defendant’s immediate possession or control.
• (b)  Upon issuance of an order to relinquish one or more firearms or ammunition pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (8), the defendant shall relinquish any firearm or ammunition not more than twenty-four hours after being served with the order; except that a court may allow a defendant up to seventy-two hours to relinquish a firearm or up to five days to relinquish ammunition pursuant to this paragraph (b) if the defendant demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that he or she is unable to comply within twenty-four hours. To satisfy this requirement, the defendant may:
• (I)  Sell or transfer possession of the firearm or ammunition to a federally licensed firearms dealer described in 18 U.S.C. sec. 923, as amended; except that this provision shall not be interpreted to require any federally licensed firearms dealer to purchase or accept possession of any firearm or ammunition;
• (II)  Arrange for the storage of the firearm or ammunition by a law enforcement agency; except that this provision shall not be interpreted to require any law enforcement agency to provide storage of firearms or ammunition for any person; or
• (III)  Sell or otherwise transfer the firearm or ammunition to a private party who may legally possess the firearm or ammunition; except that a defendant who sells or transfers a firearm pursuant to this subparagraph (III) shall satisfy all of the provisions of section 18-12-112, concerning private firearms transfers, including but not limited to the performance of a criminal background check of the transferee.
• (c)  If a defendant is unable to satisfy the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subsection (8) because he or she is incarcerated or otherwise held in the custody of a law enforcement agency, the court shall require the defendant to satisfy such provisions not more than twenty-four hours after his or her release from incarceration or custody or be held in contempt of court. Notwithstanding any provision of this paragraph (c), the court may, in its discretion, require the defendant to relinquish any firearm or ammunition in the defendant’s immediate possession or control or subject to the defendant’s immediate possession or control before the end of the defendant’s incarceration. In such a case, a defendant’s failure to relinquish a firearm or ammunition as required shall constitute contempt of court.
• (d)  A federally licensed firearms dealer who takes possession of a firearm or ammunition pursuant to this subsection (8) shall issue a receipt to the defendant at the time of relinquishment. The federally licensed firearms dealer shall not return the firearm or ammunition to the defendant unless the dealer:
• (I)  Contacts the bureau to request that a background check of the defendant be performed; and
• (II)  Obtains approval of the transfer from the bureau after the performance of the background check.
• (e)  A local law enforcement agency may elect to store firearms or ammunition for persons pursuant to this subsection (8). If an agency so elects:
• (I)  The agency may charge a fee for such storage, the amount of which shall not exceed the direct and indirect costs incurred by the agency in providing such storage;
• (II)  The agency may establish policies for disposal of abandoned or stolen firearms or ammunition; and
• (III)  The agency shall issue a receipt to each defendant at the time the defendant relinquishes possession of a firearm or ammunition.
• (f)  If a local law enforcement agency elects to store firearms or ammunition for a defendant pursuant to this subsection (8), the law enforcement agency shall not return the firearm or ammunition to the defendant unless the agency:
• (I)  Contacts the bureau to request that a background check of the defendant be performed; and
• (II)  Obtains approval of the transfer from the bureau after the performance of the background check.
• (g)
• (I)  A law enforcement agency that elects to store a firearm or ammunition for a defendant pursuant to this subsection (8) may elect to cease storing the firearm or ammunition. A law enforcement agency that elects to cease storing a firearm or ammunition for a defendant shall notify the defendant of such decision and request that the defendant immediately make arrangements for the transfer of the possession of the firearm or ammunition to the defendant or, if the defendant is prohibited from possessing a firearm, to another person who is legally permitted to possess a firearm.
• (II)  If a law enforcement agency elects to cease storing a firearm or ammunition for a defendant and notifies the defendant as described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (g), the law enforcement agency may dispose of the firearm or ammunition if the defendant fails to make arrangements for the transfer of the firearm or ammunition and complete said transfer within ninety days of receiving such notification.
• (h)  If a defendant sells or otherwise transfers a firearm or ammunition to a private party who may legally possess the firearm or ammunition, as described in subparagraph (III) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (8), the defendant shall acquire:
• (I)  From the transferee, a written receipt acknowledging the transfer, which receipt shall be dated and signed by the defendant and the transferee; and
• (II)  From the licensed gun dealer who requests from the bureau a background check of the transferee, as described in section 18-12-112, a written statement of the results of the background check.
• (i)  (I) Not more than three business days after the relinquishment, the defendant shall file a copy of the receipt issued pursuant to paragraph (d), (e), or (h) of this subsection (8), and, if applicable, the written statement of the results of a background check performed on the transferee, as described in subparagraph (II) of paragraph (h) of this subsection (8), with the court as proof of the relinquishment. If a defendant fails to timely file a receipt or written statement as described in this paragraph (i):
• (A)  The failure constitutes a class 2 misdemeanor, and the defendant shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-501; and
• (B)  The court shall issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.
• (II)  In any subsequent prosecution for a violation of this paragraph (i), the court shall take judicial notice of the defendant’s failure to file a receipt or written statement, which will constitute prima facie evidence that the defendant has violated this paragraph (i), and testimony of the clerk of the court or his or her deputy is not required.
• (j)
• (I)  A law enforcement agency that elects in good faith to not store a firearm or ammunition for a defendant pursuant to subsection (8)(b)(II) of this section shall not be held criminally or civilly liable for such election not to act.
• (II)  A law enforcement agency that returns possession of a firearm or ammunition to a defendant in good faith as permitted by paragraph (f) of this subsection (8) shall not be held criminally or civilly liable for such action.

• (1)  The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting in injury to, serious bodily injury to, or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close to the scene as possible or shall immediately return to the scene of the accident. The driver shall then remain at the scene of the accident until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of section 42-4-1603 (1). Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.
• (1.5)  It shall not be an offense under this section if a driver, after fulfilling the requirements of subsection (1) of this section and of section 42-4-1603 (1), leaves the scene of the accident for the purpose of reporting the accident in accordance with the provisions of sections 42-4-1603 (2) and 42-4-1606.
• (2)  Any person who violates any provision of this section commits:
• (a)  A class 1 misdemeanor traffic offense if the accident resulted in injury to any person;
• (b)  A class 4 felony if the accident resulted in serious bodily injury to any person;
• (c)  A class 3 felony if the accident resulted in the death of any person.
• (3)  The department shall revoke the driver’s license of the person so convicted. A revocation pursuant to this subsection (3) runs concurrently with any suspension imposed pursuant to section 42-2-127.9, if imposed as a result of the same episode of driving.
• (4)  As used in this section and sections 42-4-1402.5, 42-4-1603, and 42-4-1606:
• (a)  “Injury” means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition.
• (b)  “Serious bodily injury” means injury that involves, either at the time of the actual injury or at a later time, a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, or a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or burns of the second or third degree.

• (1)  (a) A person commits child abuse if such person causes an injury to a child’s life or health, or permits a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child’s life or health, or engages in a continued pattern of conduct that results in malnourishment, lack of proper medical care, cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of injuries that ultimately results in the death of a child or serious bodily injury to a child.
• (b)
• (I)  Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (b), a person commits child abuse if such person excises or infibulates, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, vulva, or clitoris of a female child. A parent, guardian, or other person legally responsible for a female child or charged with the care or custody of a female child commits child abuse if he or she allows the excision or infibulation, in whole or in part, of such child’s labia majora, labia minora, vulva, or clitoris.
• (II)  Belief that the conduct described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) is required as a matter of custom, ritual, or standard practice or consent to the conduct by the child on whom it is performed or by the child’s parent or legal guardian shall not be an affirmative defense to a charge of child abuse under this paragraph (b).
• (III)  A surgical procedure as described in subsection (1)(b)(I) of this section is not a crime if the procedure:
• (A)  Is necessary to preserve the health of the child on whom it is performed and is performed by a person licensed to practice medicine under article 240 of title 12; or
• (B)  Is performed on a child who is in labor or who has just given birth and is performed for medical purposes connected with that labor or birth by a person licensed to practice medicine under article 240 of title 12.
• (IV)  If the district attorney having jurisdiction over a case arising under this paragraph (b) has a reasonable belief that any person arrested or charged pursuant to this paragraph (b) is not a citizen or national of the United States, the district attorney shall report such information to the immigration and naturalization service, or any successor agency, in an expeditious manner.
• (c)
• (I)  A person commits child abuse if, in the presence of a child, or on the premises where a child is found, or where a child resides, or in a vehicle containing a child, the person knowingly engages in the manufacture or attempted manufacture of a controlled substance, as defined by section 18-18-102 (5), or knowingly possesses ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, with the intent to use the product as an immediate precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance. It shall be no defense to the crime of child abuse, as described in this subparagraph (I), that the defendant did not know a child was present, a child could be found, a child resided on the premises, or that a vehicle contained a child.
• (II)  A parent or lawful guardian of a child or a person having the care or custody of a child who knowingly allows the child to be present at or reside at a premises or to be in a vehicle where the parent, guardian, or person having care or custody of the child knows or reasonably should know another person is engaged in the manufacture or attempted manufacture of methamphetamine commits child abuse.
• (III)  A parent or lawful guardian of a child or a person having the care or custody of a child who knowingly allows the child to be present at or reside at a premises or to be in a vehicle where the parent, guardian, or person having care or custody of the child knows or reasonably should know another person possesses ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, with the intent to use the product as an immediate precursor in the manufacture of methamphetamine commits child abuse.
• (2)  In this section, “child” means a person under the age of sixteen years.
• (3)  The statutory privilege between patient and physician and between husband and wife shall not be available for excluding or refusing testimony in any prosecution for a violation of this section.
• (4)  No person, other than the perpetrator, complicitor, coconspirator, or accessory, who reports an instance of child abuse to law enforcement officials shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability for any consequence of making such report unless he knows at the time of making it that it is untrue.
• (5)  Deferred prosecution is authorized for a first offense under this section unless the provisions of subsection (7.5) of this section or section 18-6-401.2 apply.
• (6)  Repealed.
• (7) (a) Where death or injury results, the following shall apply:
• (I)  When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse results in death to the child, it is a class 2 felony except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection (7).
• (II)  When a person acts with criminal negligence and the child abuse results in death to the child, it is a class 3 felony.
• (III)  When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse results in serious bodily injury to the child, it is a class 3 felony.
• (IV)  When a person acts with criminal negligence and the child abuse results in serious bodily injury to the child, it is a class 4 felony.
• (V)  When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse results in any injury other than serious bodily injury, it is a class 1 misdemeanor; except that, if it is committed under the circumstances described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (7), then it is a class 5 felony.
• (VI)  When a person acts with criminal negligence and the child abuse results in any injury other than serious bodily injury to the child, it is a class 2 misdemeanor; except that, if it is committed under the circumstances described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (7), then it is a class 5 felony.
• (b)  Where no death or injury results, the following shall apply:
• (I)  An act of child abuse when a person acts knowingly or recklessly is a class 2 misdemeanor; except that, if it is committed under the circumstances described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (7), then it is a class 5 felony.
• (II)  An act of child abuse when a person acts with criminal negligence is a class 3 misdemeanor; except that, if it is committed under the circumstances described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (7), then it is a class 5 felony.
• (c)  When a person knowingly causes the death of a child who has not yet attained twelve years of age and the person committing the offense is one in a position of trust with respect to the child, such person commits the crime of murder in the first degree as described in section 18-3-102 (1)(f).
• (d)  When a person commits child abuse as described in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, it is a class 3 felony.
• (e)  A person who has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or of an offense in any other state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that would constitute child abuse if committed in this state and who commits child abuse as provided in subparagraph (V) or (VI) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (7) or as provided in subparagraph (I) or (II) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) commits a class 5 felony if the trier of fact finds that the new offense involved any of the following acts:
• (I)  The defendant, who was in a position of trust, as described in section 18-3-401 (3.5), in relation to the child, participated in a continued pattern of conduct that resulted in the child’s malnourishment or failed to ensure the child’s access to proper medical care;
• (II)  The defendant participated in a continued pattern of cruel punishment or unreasonable isolation or confinement of the child;
• (III)  The defendant made repeated threats of harm or death to the child or to a significant person in the child’s life, which threats were made in the presence of the child;
• (IV)  The defendant committed a continued pattern of acts of domestic violence, as that term is defined in section 18-6-800.3, in the presence of the child; or
• (V)  The defendant participated in a continued pattern of extreme deprivation of hygienic or sanitary conditions in the child’s daily living environment.
• (7.3) Felony child abuse is an extraordinary risk crime that is subject to the modified presumptive sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-401 (10). Misdemeanor child abuse is an extraordinary risk crime that is subject to the modified sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-501 (3).
• (7.5) If a defendant is convicted of the class 2 or class 3 felony of child abuse under subparagraph (I) or (III) of paragraph (a) of subsection (7) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with section 18-1.3-401 (8)(d).
• (8)  Repealed.
• (9)  (a) If a parent is charged with permitting a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child’s life or health, pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section, and the child was seventy-two hours old or younger at the time of the alleged offense, it is an affirmative defense to the charge that the parent safely, reasonably, and knowingly handed the child over to a firefighter, as defined in section 18-3-201 (1.5), or to a staff member who engages in the admission, care, or treatment of patients at a hospital or community clinic emergency center, as defined in subsection (9)(b) of this section, when the firefighter is at a fire station, or the staff member is at a hospital or community clinic emergency center, as defined in subsection (9)(b) of this section.
• (b)  “Community clinic emergency center” means a community clinic licensed by the department of public health and environment pursuant to section 25-3-101 (2)(a)(I)(B) that:
• (I)  Delivers emergency services; and
• (II)  Provides emergency care twenty-four hours per day and seven days a week throughout the year, except if located in a rural or frontier area that does not have the demand to support twenty-four-hour service or only operates each year during a specified time period due to seasonal population influx.

• (1)  A person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Menacing is a class 3 misdemeanor, but it is a class 5 felony if committed:
• (a)  By the use of a deadly weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to cause a person to reasonably believe that the article is a deadly weapon; or
• (b)  By the person representing verbally or otherwise that he or she is armed with a deadly weapon.

• (1)  Any person who knowingly confines or detains another without the other’s consent and without proper legal authority commits false imprisonment. This section does not apply to a peace officer acting in good faith within the scope of his or her duties.
• (2)  False imprisonment is a class 2 misdemeanor; except that false imprisonment is a class 5 felony if:
• (a)
• (I)  The person uses force or threat of force to confine or detain the other person; and
• (II)  The person confines or detains the other person for twelve hours or longer; or
• (b)
• (I)  The person confines or detains another person less than eighteen years of age in a locked or barricaded room under circumstances that cause bodily injury or serious emotional distress; and
• (II)  Such confinement or detention was part of a continued pattern of cruel punishment or unreasonable isolation or confinement of the child; or
• (c)  The person confines or detains another person less than eighteen years of age by means of tying, caging, chaining, or otherwise using similar physical restraints to restrict that person’s freedom of movement under circumstances that cause bodily injury or serious emotional distress.
• (3)  Notwithstanding section 13-90-107 or any other provision of law, the statutory privilege between a patient and a physician or between an individual and his or her spouse is not available for the purpose of excluding or refusing testimony in any prosecution for a violation of this section where the conditions described in subsection (2)(b) or (2)(c) of this section are alleged.
• (4)  Nothing in this section limits the ability of a person to assert the affirmative defense described in section 18-1-703.

• Every person who obtains control over any stolen thing of value, knowing the thing of value to have been stolen by another, may be tried, convicted, and punished whether or not the principal is charged, tried, or convicted.

• A person commits a class 2 misdemeanor, when, with knowledge that it is forged, and with intent to defraud, such person possesses any forged instrument of a kind covered by section 18-5-104.

• A person who purchases any personal property on credit and thereafter, before paying for it, sells, hypothecates, pledges, or disposes of it with intent to defraud the seller or vendor commits a class 2 misdemeanor.

• (1)  A person commits use of a forged academic record if, with intent to seek employment or with intent to seek admission to a public or private institution of higher education in this state or for the purpose of securing a scholarship or other form of financial assistance from the institution itself or from other public or private sources of financial assistance, such person falsely makes, completes, alters, or utters a written instrument which is or purports to be, or is calculated to become or to represent if completed, a bona fide academic record of an institution of secondary or higher education.
• (2)  For purposes of this section:
• (a)  “Academic record” means a transcript, diploma, grade report, or similar document of an institution of secondary or higher education.
• (b)  “Financial assistance” means financial assistance for educational purposes, including, but not limited to, loans, scholarships, grants, fellowships, assistantships, work-study programs, or other forms of financial aid.
• (3)  Use of a forged academic record is a class 1 misdemeanor